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ABSTRACT
This paper interprets the Maastricht convergence criteria as an 
incentive mechanism that offers entry into European Monetary 
Union (EMU) as an uncertain reward for candidate countries' 
convergence efforts. Similarly, under the 'stability pact' agreed at 
the Dublin summit in December 1996 countries risk penalties for 
insufficient discipline inside EMU. The paper suggests a partial 
trade-off between the entry conditions and the stability pact. Both 
incentive devices should be designed jointly in order to achieve 
Maastricht's twin objectives of a single currency for a large 
enough group of countries and a stable currency, i.e. based on 
sufficient and durable convergence.
' 1 would like to thank Michael Artis, Spyros Vassilakis and Barry Eichengreen for helpful 






















































































































































































Europe's ambition to install Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) before the end 
of the millenium has provoked great controversy among policymakers and within the 
economics profession. Two issues can be distinguished, first whether EMU is a 
desirable project to undertake and second how best to achieve it. This paper focusses 
on the second problem. The transition strategy originally envisaged by the fathers of 
the Maastricht treaty, like the drive for EMU itself, was a product of the experience 
with the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Since 1987 central parities of the participating currencies had no longer been 
adjusted, inflation and interest rates had been converging for some time. The 
philosophy behind the "Maastricht road to EMU", therefore, invoked a smooth 
transition to monetary union by a further gradual hardening of the ERM and 
strengthening of the convergence process. The transformation of an ever closer 
"quasi-EMU", where control of monetary policy was still nominally in the hands of 
national authorities, to full-blown monetary union would then appear to be a small 
and logical final step.
The exchange rate based approach to EMU was blown to pieces by the exchange 
rate crises of 1992-93. Since then, in the absence of any meaningful exchange rate 
constraint or institutionalized policy co-ordination, the burden of organizing 
European Monetary Union has almost exclusively fallen on the convergence criteria. 
It is therefore important to explore whether the Maastricht criteria are an adequate, or 
perhaps even superior, substitute for the ERM in providing national policymakers 
with the right incentives for continuing convergence and securing EMU. In view of 
the the "pact for stability and growth" agreed in Dublin in December 1996 it is 
equally important to understand how such a pact could supplement, alter, or replace 
the entry conditions. Section two examines the Maastricht criteria's incentive effects 
on individual countries in the run-up to EMU (or under a the stability pact within 
EMU). Section three explores how the criteria (the stability pact) might be chosen 
optimally by a designer interested in convergence and (perhaps) also in EMU coming 
about.
In order to understand the various roles that the criteria have to play "post-ERM" 
in the transition to EMU, it is instructive to briefly recall the principal reactions to the 
crisis of 1992-93. One such reaction was that the crisis had demonstrated that EMU 
was premature and had to be delayed until economies had converged much further. 
Another view, on the contrary, held that the crisis showed that EMU had to be 
introduced quickly, otherwise countries would start to diverge again and EMU would 
never happen (De Grauwe, 1994, 1995). A third viewpoint was that the crisis said 
nothing about EMU, but had only shown that the ERM was unstable in the presence 



























































































the ERM against speculative attacks (Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1993). Fourth, the 
crisis had demonstrated that the ERM, the convergence process and EMU itself 
could not survive as long as control rested exclusively with national policymakers. 
Therefore already ahead of EMU there had to be institutions, e.g. an upgraded 
European Monetary Institute, that provide for effective policy co-ordination (Artis 
1994). Fifth, on the contrary, the collapse of the ERM had been a blessing in disguise 
(Haller 1994) because it had destroyed the illusion of convergence and co-ordinated 
policies. Durable and credible convergence would have to be built "bottom-up" and 
by national efforts only.
In essence all the above statements can be traced back to the early debate between 
the "economist" and the "monetarist" approaches to monetary union, which is a 
version of the "chicken and egg" problem: must convergence precede monetary union 
or will (only) the irrevocable locking of exchange rates produce durable 
convergence? In other words: should institutional innovations (like the ERM or 
EMU) be no more than the expression and final outcome of common policies, or 
should they be the instrument to induce such common policies in the first place? The 
Maastricht criteria1 can be seen as a compromise between both views. By making 
EMU conditional on prior convergence they attempt to secure favourable initial 
conditions before embarking on the single currency. By making entry of individual 
countries dependent on convergence and by setting a firm final deadline for the start 
of EMU in 1999, the criteria also provide the instrument and incentives to actually 
induce the desired convergence.
This suggests that the Maastricht treaty is best understood as a simple incentive 
contract2. It offers a "carrot", i.e. the reward of EMU entry, and a "stick", in the form 
of the convergence criteria that impose costly adjustment on individual countries, 
which however is regarded as necessary and desirable for the success of EMU. This 
paper seeks to explore how the criteria operate in providing convergence incentives. 
It does not go into the debate about whether the induced convergence is sensible nor 
does it have much to say about whether the precise criteria selected in the treaty 
provide the right "stick" to enforce the desired behaviour. In Winkler (1995 and 
1996a) it is argued that the criteria are best interpreted as indicators of (past, present 
and future) credibility. In stage two of EMU, candidate countries are asked to 
demonstrate their stability orientation before joining and then co-determining the 
(expected and actual) performance of the new single currency. Winkler (1996b)
1 The criteria call for inflation and interest rates to he within 1,5 percentage points of the the three 
best performers and for membership of the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) for at least two years 
without devaluation on own initiative. The fiscal criteria stipulate a deficit of at most 3% and a 
public debt of at most 60% in relation to the candidate's GDP. See Buiter et al (1993) and Bini- 
Smaghi et al. (1994) for discussions.




























































































suggests that the criteria represent an imperfect and incomplete contract since 
important variables (say, "stability culture" or "sound public finances") are not 
observable, verifiable or contractible directly. However, by structuring the sequence 
of actions and the procedures for the decisions governing the transition to EMU, by 
creating deadlines and institutions, the treaty still can provide effective instruments 
for achieving its twin objectives: organizing convergence and the launch of EMU 
(Winkler 1996c).
In order to make sense as entry conditions for EMU the convergence criteria must 
satisfy two requirements. First, the behaviour they induce in stage two must have 
lasting and beneficial effects on stage three. This could be the case either because 
convergence is desirable per se, e.g. by rendering economies more similar or flexible, 
or (as argued above) because information about countries' willingness and ability to 
sustain stability oriented policies is revealed, which in turn is a condition for durable 
success of EMU. Second, the criteria must be seen to address inefficiencies, for 
example from time inconsistency problems of national monetary policies, political 
deficit biases of fiscal policy or externalities from uncoordinated policies across 
countries. Concentrating on the latter, the Maastricht criteria serve their purpose if 
they can induce desirable actions that would otherwise not be undertaken. In 
particular the criteria are important if producing convergence and credibility for 
EMU has public good features, i.e. if it requires individual sacrifice for the common 
good. One example is fiscal consolidation to the extent that it lowers inflation 
expectations and long term interest rates in EMU for the benefit of all participants. 
More generally, any adjustment that renders Europe's economies, institutions and 
preferences more homogenous will reduce potential conflicts and losses from 
centralizing monetary policy in EMU and thereby enhance its stability.
2. Single Country Convergence Incentives
This section explores how the convergence criteria in the Maastricht treaty can 
serve as an incentive device by making entry into EMU conditional on satisfying 
certain minimal conditions3. In equation 1 the criteria can be seen to determine p(E), 
which is the probability (or perhaps the timing) of a country's accession to EMU, as a 
function of convergence effort (E). E only concerns the extra Maastricht-induced 
component of convergence, i.e. abstracts from the convergence effort that a country 
would find in its own interest to undertake in preparation for EMU in the absence of
3 The framework is as in Dornbusch's (1991) model of exchange rate based stabilization in 
developing countries. Similar problems arise in the design of optimal disinflation (Agenor 1993) 




























































































the entry conditions4. For the Agent this extra convergence is costly with increasing 
marginal costs. The higher (5, the more painful it is for a country to pursue rigid fiscal 
and monetary policies or unpopular reforms in preparation for EMU. The 
(discounted) net benefit, i.e. the "reward" from joining EMU in stage three (such as 
transaction costs savings, credibility gains or political prestige) is denoted by T.
U = p ( E ) T - ^ E 2 (1)
In the absence of uncertainty p(E) will be a two-valued function; it will be equal to 
one if all the criteria are satisfied and zero if not. In this case a country will undertake 
the required mimimum level of convergence if the (discounted) benefits of EMU 
exceed the costs of convergence. However, uncertainty in relation to the Maastricht 
conditions arises from two principal sources. First, it is unclear ex ante how strictly 
the criteria will be interpreted, what other factors might determine the entry decision 
and whether EMU will happen at all. Moreover, some of the criteria are relative 
performance measures, i.e. depend on the behaviour of other countries. Second, there 
is forecasting uncertainty concerning the economic conditions which affect 
convergence success and there is instrument uncertainty regarding how the 
convergence measures that are taken will impact on the target variables. On both 
counts uncertainty can be seen to intervene between convergence effort and 
convergence success as measured by the criteria. The presumption is that 
convergence effort is not or cannot be contracted for directly.
Therefore, more specifically, entry to EMU will be granted if convergence exceeds 
some threshold value M, the Maastricht criteria. In equation 2 fulfilment F of the 
entry conditions depends on convergence effort E, but also on a random term 0. The 
marginal "productivity" of effort with respect to the relevant target variables, i.e. the 
effectiveness of convergence measures taken, is measured by a . From this we can 
derive an expression for the probability of success p(E) for some distribution function 
/(0 ) ,  in equation 3.
Jo if aE + 0 
= {1 if aE + 0
< M 
a M (2)
p(E)  = p( t i * \ i>) =
00
J /(B )d 0 where s  M -  aE (3)
v
4 Otherwise T would also have to be modelled as a function of E. Here we are only interested in 
the additional effects from the convergence criteria, which could also be seen to counter domestic 
political distortions, such as myopia by governments or electorates, that might prevent countries to 




























































































A country faced with the Maastricht threshold M and a prospective reward from 
EMU of size T maximizes equation 1 with respect to E, which yields the first order 
condition for optimal effort E*. For a maximum, the second order condition in 
Appendix A must also be satisfied.





With convergence costly and reward uncertain, optimal convergence effort will not 
guarantee entry into EMU. The probability of success can be obtained by substituting 
the optimal convergence effort into equation 3. We summarize the comparative 
statics properties of the model in Proposition 1.
PROPOSITION 1: Optimal convergence effort E* is increasing in T, decreasing in 
p. A higher M increases effort for f(\p)>(), otherwise it reduces effort. The effect of 
changing a  is negative for f(xp)>0, positive otherwise. The corresponding 
equilibrium probability p* is always increasing in T and a , decreasing in p and M.
Proof: see Appendix A.
The results for T and P are straight-forward. If the rewards from EMU increase (or 
the costs of convergence decrease) on the margin, then both the optimal convergence 
effort and the probability of success go up. For f(\p)>Q tightening the convergence 
criteria (raising Af), will lead to an increase in effort. The impact on the entry 
probability is always negative. For the productivity parameter a  the impact on effort 
is again ambiguous. For /'(xp>>0, effort will be increased in response to tougher entry 
conditions, but falls in response to higher productivity, say, as economic conditions 
become more favourable.
Proposition 1 describes the comparative statics around a local maximum. With a 
distribution function of infinite range the existence of an interior solution is assured, 
but there may be more than one (local) maximum and altering parameters may then 
cause a shift in the global maximum. Appendix B gives sufficient conditions for a 
unique maximum in the case of the normal distribution.
Leaving aside the complications of possible multiple solutions to equation 4, what 
can we learn from this model about the debate on the interpretation of the Maastricht 
criteria? A (credible) tightening of the criteria, all else equal, leads to increased 
convergence effort (as long as f(\p)>i)), but always a lower probability of success. 
From this perspective the Bundesbank's and the German supreme court’s insistence 
on a strict interpretation of the criteria can be useful in sustaining convergence 
incentives. However, if the aim of the criteria is to induce a high degree of 
convergence but also to allow a decent probability of entry the conditions must be set 
such as to trade-off the two effects optimally. The impact o f a recession on 




























































































the convergence targets look further away it is equivalent to raising M. If recession 
makes any given level of effort more painful (e.g. unpopular or economically costly) 
it increases (3; if it makes convergence results harder to obtain, for given effort, it 
lowers a. Political uncertainty about the EMU project or doubts about its benefits 
will lower the expected rewards from EMU (T) and thereby reduce both effort and 
the probability of success. This explains why countries only start to undertake serious 
convergence programmes as the 1999 deadline draws closer and prospects for EMU 
look more certain. It also explains why countries like Italy, who hope to gain most 
from EMU, are willing to use the Maastricht criteria to impose considerable 
sacrifices, while for countries with a low or negative T (like the UK) the incentive 
effects of the criteria will be minimal or non-existent.
The Role o f Uncertainty
In trying to model convergence incentives we have stressed that either the link 
from convergence effort to convergence success or the interpretation of the 
Maastricht criteria is uncertain. This seems to be an accurate description of the actual 
situation confronted by countries trying to meet the entry conditions. However, the 
degree of uncertainty can vary or can be made to vary. It is interesting to note that 
there has been little concerted effort to clarify the ambiguities in the wording of the 
criteria or to clarify their application, apart from the obvious unilateral attempts to 
push for stricter or laxer interpretations. The convergence reports issued by the EMI 
and the Commission as part of a "dry-run" in 1996, foreseen in the Treaty in order to 
determine whether EMU could go ahead at a starting date earlier than the 1999 
deadline, have not resulted in more precision and clarification with respect to the 
criteria. Even though such reports are not binding they might have important 
commitment value. In terms of our model the main effect of any such clarification of 
the criteria would have been a reduction in uncertainty and perhaps an adjustment of 
some of the parameters, notably M. The question that arises immediately, is whether 
the Commission and the EMI were wise in avoiding such a reduction of uncertainty.
There are three principal reasons why a degree of vagueness may actually be 
beneficial. First, imprecision ex ante, may ex post allow for a response to shocks that 
could not have been foreseen or contracted for originally. It thus preserves flexibility. 
Secondly, it opens up the possibility of mutually beneficial renegotiation, perhaps 
involving issue linkage across unrelated areas. However, if the EMU entry decision 
is left to intergovernmental bargaining the ex ante convergence incentives can suffer 
(cf. Winkler 1996c). This paper addresses the third case for preserving uncertainty 
about the criteria, which can actually have a positive effect on convergence 
incentives. Intuitively, as long as there is some hope that the application of the 




























































































continue theÜTeffbrttand not!give Up. Conversely, even,countries that arc well within; 
the Maastrichtilimits'will not'sitibackkasslhngas some’uncertainty remains.
Tio illustrate this-intuition, we compare our model above witth the: results obtained 
iin the absence: of uncertainty, .iie.. with: Bfcft) ihi equatiàm22. Then: the probability' of! 
entry fl(Ej) and! the’ optimal! convergence effbrt: become just two-valUed: fbnctions, 
whichicamheexpressed; irr.terms ôfi a: critical lvalue: 777, as the minimum reward! ffam; 
BMUtltat just compensates-dor; complying with’the Mhastrichticriteriai
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We cant compare these results' to, those obtained earlierr and: summarize: im 
Proposition^, assuming/Ay)>()iforrinfinite range
PROPOSITION! 22 Optimal convergence effort: E* will! be greater fbrr the model 1 
withiuneertaintyfbrr
77 c  77 alwayss
TT =  77 never
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Proof: see Appendix:A\
Again, Appendix B gives' sufficient conditions fbr uncertainty generating1, higher, 
convergence effort alt large enough 77 in; the case o f tHe normal distribution. The 
results in RfopositionZ confirm our earlier intuition; "Hopeless cases", for whom the 
convergence mandated exceed^ the: benefits under; certainty, and who thus give up. 
can be induced to undertake convergence effort under: uncertainty "Safe cases" (for 
high enough 77) again exert higher effbrt under uncertainty, that keeps them on their 
toes, while they would be content to just meet the entry conditions under certainty. In 
the intermediate range fbr 77 convergence incentives are weakened; rather than1 
sharpened; by uncertainty. This is-the usual result: one would expect fbri incentive 
schemes more general than the. simple Maastricht threshold contract: Clearly, 
introducing uncertainty first:of all reduces the (expected) reward:from satisfying the 
criteria and! thus reduces the amount of convergence countries are willing to 
undertake. The result that uncertainty could leadito Higher; efforUcan arise only if! the 




























































































certainty or sufficiently "too low" in that only part of the effort a country would be 
willing to undertake is extracted by the treaty. In other words the assumption is that 
in the absence of uncertainty M could not be set "optimally" by a Principal interested 
in maximizing convergence. This may be because he is not allowed to discriminate 
among individual countries (i.e. has to set the same threshold for everybody), it may 
be because he lacks precise knowledge of countries' objective functions or, finally, 
because M  cannot be determined unilaterally by the Principal but is determined from 
various other considerations apart from maximizing overall effort. All of these are 
features of the Maastricht treaty which could render the criteria second-best even in 
the absence of shocks, ambiguities and contractability problems.
If the Commission, the EMI or European governments decide to resolve the 
residual ambiguities in the criteria and if economic uncertainty recedes as the 
deadline draws near, our model predicts that only those countries that are close to 
fulfilling the criteria will intensify their efforts, all others will slacken off. Hence, if 
the aim is to maximize both convergence and entry probabilities it may be a good 
idea to remain vague about how the criteria will in the end be applied and thus to 
keep hope and incentives alive for the greatest possible number of member states. 
However, to be effective, entry probabilities must clearly reflect convergence effort, 
and while not contractable directly, this effort may perhaps be observable. If 
countries come to believe that the entry decisions will be taken purely or primarily on 
"political" grounds, obviously convergence incentives are lost. Thus the model 
provides an answer to the criticism of the criteria that argues that either they will be 
useless because they will be overridden politically or that they will be harmful 
because they cannot possibly be met. We argue that it is precisely the uncertainty 
about the flexibility and interpretation of the criteria that renders the criteria useful 
and beneficial as a compromise between the two extreme cases5.
Finally, we should note that we have only compared our uncertainty model with 
the benchmark deterministic model. The effect of increasing uncertainty (say, the 
variance) within the model will depend on the characteristics of the distribution 
function. We can, however, imagine a mean-preserving spread that increases 
uncertainty, i.e. redistributes probability weight from the centre to the tails. Near the 
centre of the distribution /(vp) decreases and E* will go down (from equation 4), 
whereas along the tails the opposite is true. In other words, raising uncertainty
5 The leaked statements by German finance minister Waigel before a parliamentary committee in 
the summer of 1995, where he asserted that Italy would not be in the first group joining EMU "and 
they know it", provides an instructive episode. The press report caused a severe market reaction 
against the Lira and Italian bonds. From the perspective of this model, not because the markets 
necessarily had had a much more optimistic view on Italian entry probabilities, but rather because 




























































































increases convergence incentives where the probability of entry is already very high 
(or very low), whereas in the middle range the opposite holds. Appendix B shows the 
effect of increasing the variance for the case of the normal distribution's
Credibility Feedback
The public's (market's) expectation of a country's EMU entry probability pe could 
itself feedback into the actual probability of success p. For example, the market's 
expectation of EMU could lead to lower inflation expectations and lower interest 
rates, i.e. a smaller interest burden in the budget and perhaps higher confidence and 
growth. Both should reduce budget deficits and in turn increase the likelihood of 
meeting the Maastricht criteria. Equation 3 then becomes
Here the formulation is in terms of a negative feedback r on the perceived 
probability of failure (1 - p e). The more markets expect a country to be excluded 
from EMU, the more difficult it becomes to meet the criteria. If market expectations 
are treated as given, note that the negative feedback is equivalent to an increase in M 
and the comparative statics results in Proposition 1 apply. A higher probability of 
non-EMU therefore leads to increased (compensating) convergence effort but to a 
smaller probability of success. Exogenous shifts in expectations in particular can be 
used to model changes in market sentiment with respect to the risk of the EMU 
project falling apart altogether. However, reductions of EMU's fortunes that are 
independent of any individual country's convergence effort, are captured in the 
expected (discounted) benefits from EMU, i.e. correspond to a lower T in our model. 
In this case, therefore, convergence incentives and EMU probability are 
unambiguously reduced.
Returning to the country and convergence specific component of market 
expectations, as long as the latter are treated as exogenous, every level of market 
confidence will correspond to a different optimal convergence effort from the first 
order condition in (4). However, if market expectations are formed rationally they 
should (at least on average) reflect the true probability of EMU entry. Under rational 
expectations p=pe and the policymaker should take the credibility feedback into 
account when optimizing. This modifies his first order condition as follows. 6
6 We have explored the effects of uncertainty under the assumption of risk neutrality. If agents are 
risk averse there will be a welfare loss from increasing uncertainty and risk aversion will by itself 
affect the incentives to converge.




























































































PROPOSITION 3: The introduction of a (negative) credibility feedback under 
rational expectations gives rise to a credibility multiplier with respect to the original 
first order condition. Optimal effort becomes as in equation 9 below. The effect of an 
increase of the feedback parameter x on optimal effort is ambiguous, whereas the 
probability of success is unambiguously increased.
E* dp T _ aT  __
dE P _ m , p [ l - t / ( i p ) ] '
dE * 
dx






Proof: see Appendix A.
That the impact of the feedback parameter on effort can go either way is intuitive. 
On the one hand, it provides an extra incentive for convergence to the extent that 
increasing (1 -p) is equivalent to raising M. On the other hand, the feedback multiplier 
effect means that less convergence effort is necessary to achieve any given 
improvement in the probability. Increasing feedback, however, unambiguously 
increases the probability of success.
Speculative attacks would be an obvious example for a high feedback parameter x, 
which punishes any deterioration in EMU entry prospects immediately and severely. 
If such attacks are treated as exogenous they simply lead to a reduction in the 
likelihood of entry, even though increased effort will partially compensate. A change 
in market sentiment will thereby lead to an actual deterioration of entry prospects. 
This could serve as a simple illustration or short-hand for the possibility of multiple 
equilibria, when expectations influence convergence incentives. However, with 
rational expectations the model as it stands produces a unique solution. When the 
policymaker takes the feedback into account he has an extra incentive to increase his 
entry probability and thus to avoid punishment by the markets. Under rational 
expectations our model therefore illustrates positive incentive effects from the threat 
of speculative attacks that will discipline policymakers. The "sticks" and "carrots" 
provided by the markets thereby complement and reinforce the role the incentive 
effects of the Maastricht criteria. Again, Italy is a good example of a country that 
was first punished and then, in the summer of 19% in particular, rewarded by the 
markets.
So far we have interpreted the model as applied to the incentive effects of the 
Maastricht entry conditions. The same framework can also be used to analyze the 
basic features of the stability pact for stage three of EMU. Then fiscal discipline (£) 
is needed to reduce the risk of incurring penalties (7) if deficits exceed the 




























































































before, including the potential benefits of uncertainy in sustaining discipline across a 
heterogenous group of countries and circumstances and also with respect to the 
credibility feedback. The latter derives from the fact (anticipated by the markets) that 
fines that are actually imposed would exacerbate fiscal problems further. Therefore, 
once the probability of fines becomes significant, market reactions could well 
accelerate and aggravate the crisis. Again, this should lead rational countries to be 
even more careful ex ante in the presence of credibility feedbacks.
3. Contract Design
In section 2 we examined convergence incentives under uncertainty from the 
perspective of an individual country confronted with the Maastricht criteria. In this 
section we explore the design problem faced by a "Principal" wishing to design an 
optimal performance contract7 *for countries seeking entry into EMU (the "Agent"). 
The Principal represents the interest of countries with high domestic monetary 
credibility who are concerned about loss of reputation and price stability in EMU. 
The Principal, most easily thought of as Germany or the Bundesbank, prefers that 
convergence and credibility be established by national effort prior to admission into 
EMU. For Agent countries, on the contrary, the whole point of EMU is to gain 
credibility more cheaply, so they prefer convergence inside EMU, if at all. Consider 
the following specific objective functions for the Principal and Agent, respectively.
V(P)  = p ( E ) ( T P - S ) + w E (10)
U(A)  = p (E)-{Ta +S ) - ^ E 2 (11)
The first term in both equations captures the expected net benefits from EMU, 
where p  (as before) reflects the probability and timing of EMU, as a function of the 
Agent's convergence efforts. The second terms capture the benefits and costs of 
convergence, respectively. The Principal cares about convergence and we adopt a 
simple linear formulation, where <o is the marginal utility of convergence*. For the 
Agent's utility we return to the general formulation of equation 1, except that we 
distinguish two components of the benefits from EMU: the non-rival net benefits TA 
(TP for the Principal) with the best example being transaction costs savings in EMU, 
and a rival component 5, which shifts costs and benefits across the contracting
7 Walsh (1995) has suggested incentive contracts to influence central hanks' conduct of monetary 
policy.
* There are two possibilities: the Principal might be interested in convergence per se (as assumed 





























































































parties. This component primarily reflects net transfers of sovereignty, broadly 
defined. This has a formal and a material aspect, i.e. the transfer of decision rights to 
European institutions and the difference this transfer makes to national welfare. We 
assume that EMU represents a net transfer of sovereignty (5) from the Principal to 
the Agent, the extent and conditions of which are subject to the provisions of the 
Maastricht treaty and, of course, will also depend on the actual policies pursued by 
the future ECB9.
One example would be the choice of monetary policy instruments of the ECB (e.g. 
reserve requirements), whether they are more conducive to an Anglo-Saxon or 
continental style financial system. Another example is the stability pact agreed in 
Dublin (discussed later on) to the extent that it shifts costs of EMU by reducing the 
risks to price stability but increases the risks and costs of countries with debt and 
deficit problems. The extent to which the ECB was modelled on the Bundesbank 
that, as a concession, went beyond what other countries might have found desirable 
is also reflected in S. While parts of the costs and benefits of pooling sovereignty are 
non-rival, there is also a rival component reflected in S. This is most evident from the 
perspective of the hard-EMS in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the ERM 
countries largely followed Bundesbank policy, which was still almost exclusively 
orientated towards domestic objectives. With this benchmark there is a clearcut 
transfer of sovereignty (and associated economic costs and benefits) from Germany 
to its partner countries simply because of the expansion of the policy domain in 
EMU. This is so even if the ECB was to have German preferences and even more so 
if European preferences were to differ. As for the rival benefits, therefore, the closer 
EMU is shaped in the German image, the smaller S.
The provisions for stage three of EMU (5) and the entry conditions p(E) are the 
two parameters of the Maastricht treaty that can be used by the Principal to influence 
the Agent's incentives. The maintained assumption, of course, is that effort cannot be 
contracted over directly, that is it may not be observable, verifiable or enforceable by 
the Principal. As in a standard Principal-Agent problem we assume that only 
convergence results can be contracted over and that the latter will be the result of 
effort and a random variable as in section two.
There are therefore basically two options for the design problem, restricted to the 
Maastricht parameters in equations 10 and 11 , i.e. make either p or S (or perhaps
9 One can distinguish conceptually the welfare loss (or gain) from centralization per se, i.e. the loss 
of differentiated national policy options, from the distribution of these losses across countries. The 
latter depend not on the total adjustment EMU requires but on the direction of convergence, i.e. to 
which (whose) economic parameters, institutional and policy choices convergence takes place. 
Given that a common policy regime is adopted, S denotes the distance from the common 




























































































even both) a function of convergence effort, where the other variable can either be 
taken as given by the Principal (case a), be chosen together with the incentive 
parameter (case b) or turn into the choice variable if the incentive mechanism is 
already pre-determined (case c). As is often done in the Principal-Agent literature, 
we look at linear contracts for illustration10. We first look at the Maastricht criteria as 
an incentive device, i.e. p(E) and subsequently investigate the option of designing a 
contract (e.g. the stability pact) such that the (rival) benefits of EMU become a 
function of convergence S(E).
The Maastricht Criteria
As in the more explicit model of section two, the Maastricht criteria are seen to 
govern candidate countries' probability to join EMU as a positive function of their 
convergence effort. In order to affect convergence incentives and the likelihood of 
EMU the Principal may be able to influence one or more of the Maastricht 
parameters in the following ways.
la) Contract {p(E)=mpE}
If entry probability is a linear function of convergence effort, the Principal chooses 
the marginal effort incentive with respect to entry probability mp in order to 
maximize (10) subject to the Agent's first order condition obtained from maximizing 
( 11).
Max V(P)  = m E(TP - S ) + w E  s.t. E *(A)  = ~ { T A +S) (12)
mP P
Solving the Principal's first order condition we obtain, assuming S>TP for a 
maximum:
W r-. <»(S + Ta )
if p(E)  = mp * E * s  1 (13a)rri — «p 2 ( S - T P) ~ 2P(S -  TP)
else: m *  = — ^
" \ S  + Ta
, £*  = ' 
mp *
and p(E)  = mp *E*=  1 (13b)
Note that we restrict the entry probability to lie between zero and one, and if this 
constraint becomes binding the values for optimal incentives and effort are given by
10 This implies that without any effort the entry probability is zero, and with sufficient effort EMU 
can be assured; say, countries with debt and deficits below 60% and 3 % cannot be excluded. 
Realistically, some uncertainty will always remain and the linearity of incentives should at most be 




























































































(13b). From (13a), in choosing optimal m the Principal, in the case of S>TP, trades 
off the loss from increasing the likelihood of (costly) EMU against the gains from 
convergence. The optimal marginal incentive (m) is higher the more the Principal 
cares about convergence (u)) and the smaller his net loss from stage three of EMU. 
On the margin, Germany will be less inclined to reward convergence the less relevant 
and important it is to herself (say, if there are one-off budget manipulations) and the 
more concerned its population is about losses from EMU. The resulting optimal 
effort in equation 12a is increasing in to and the Agent's reward from stage three; 
decreasing in (3 and the Principal's net loss from EMU. In the case of a net benefit, 
i.e. if S<TP there is no conflict and therefore the Principal will maximizep=\, with m 
given from (13b). Contract la can best be seen to model a post-treaty setting, where 
the Maastricht provisions have already been fixed the features of stage three (as 
captured by S, TP and TA), but give the Principal leeway to impose his interpretation 
of the convergence criteria.
lb) Contract {p(E)=mtJL, 5}
If the Principal can choose both mp and S, we can assume that he picks S low 
enough to render EMU beneficial to himself. In that case he would want to maximize 
the probability of EMU and then trade off m and S optimally, given that constraint.
Max V(P) = mpE(TP -  S)  + cd£
mi> A





Unlike in equation 13 the two parties' net gains/losses from stage three do not 
appear in the expressions for the incentive intensity (m) and optimal effort E. The 
effort induced here is lower than in the previous problem, at least in the case where 
the probability constraint is not binding. Intuitively, given that EMU is no longer 
costly to him, he will prefer to increase both EMU gains and convergence via m, 
which through the probability constraint implies a lower optimal effort. Note also that 
the optimal S in equation 15 may turn negative. Contract lb  captures a situation 
(e.g.at the Maastricht negotiation table), where the Maastricht criteria are determined 
together with the rules governing stage three of EMU, such as central bank 
independence for example. Alternatively, the model can apply to a renegotiation or 
amendment of those features (i.e. via the stability pact) and the entry conditions 




























































































his favour he can be more generous on the convergence criteria. In this way EMU 
can be secured and the convergence effort required from the Agent will be lower than 
in the previous case, where the Principal can only rely on the criteria.
lc) Contract {5}
In this case the Principal can only choose S, whereas the incentive mechanism (i.e. 
mp) is already in place and predetermined (perhaps by other players). This situation 
might reflect a post-treaty setting, where the convergence criteria are already in place 
but some residual decisions concerning EMU are still to be taken and additional 
incentives, e.g. the stability pact couid perhaps be imposed. We solve:
Again, the optimal effort induced by the Principal is higher than in the case where 
he has two incentive instruments at his disposal (lb). The optimal S will be higher, 
i.e. the Principal will make concessions on stage three of EMU, the more he cares 
about convergence (to) and the weaker are the incentives already in place (m). S 
could turn negative, however, if the Principal's non-rival benefits from EMU are 
sufficiently below the Agent’s. In such a situation the Principal, rather than offering 
an extra reward for convergence, would instead ask for additional concessions which 
would weaken EMU's attractiveness to the Agent and hence his convergence 
incentives. The stability pact could be an example of such a reverse transfer.
The Stability Pact
The proposal for a "stability pact" to complement Maastricht was first put forward 
by the German finance minister Theo Waigel in late 1995 and calls for automatic 
sanctions in the form of fines for any breach of the fiscal criteria in stage three of 
EMU. In December 1996 the Dublin summit reached agreement that countries that 
violate the deficit criterion would have to supply an interest-free deposit of up to 
0.5% of GDP (depending on the extent of the transgression), which would be 
transformed into a fine if the deficit persists. However the sanctions are not applied 
automatically, as in the original German proposal, but are decided by qualified 
majority vote by the Council of Ministers. In particular, in the event of a severe 
recession (a contraction of more than 0.75% of GDP) sanctions may be waived. The
Max V(P) = mpE(TP - S )  + ioE
mn / — \






























































































motivation for the stability pact was the fear that countries that had great difficulty to 
converge in stage two, even under the threat of exclusion from EMU, may be even 
less likely to do so once that extra incentive has vanished. On the other hand the 
costs of convergence (here the parameter fi) should be lower in stage three, if interest 
rates and inflation come down for those countries, and therefore convergence may be 
easier to achieve inside EMU.
In terms of our model the Stability pact would have three main effects. First, 
equations 10 and 11 (or equations 1-5 in section two) can be applied to incentive 
issues in stage three. Then T (=S+TA) would be a negative penalty for the Agent and 
p(E) the probability that it will be imposed, which is now decreasing in convergence. 
Countries will be disciplined from equation 5 or 72 the greater the fines, the more the 
risk of incurring them depends on their behaviour (m or p(E)) and the lower the costs 
of fiscal austerity (P). Second, the stability pact, therefore, would alter the 
parameters of the model as applied to stage two. In particular, it should reduce the 
risks to the Principal (raise TP or lower S). This effect can be captured by contract 
7c, where the Maastricht criteria are taken as given, and it should help overcome his 
reservations over EMU. Likewise, the stability pact would affect the Agent's payoffs 
from EMU via a lower TA or lower 5 from the risk of incurring fines in EMU for 
countries entering EMU with fiscal problems.
Thirdly, the benefits of EMU could become a function of prior convergence, i.e. 
be written as S(E) in equation 11. Thus they could operate in much the same way as 
the Maastricht criteria and render it in the candidate's own interest to take corrective 
fiscal action before entering and thereby reduce the risk of incurring penalties in 
EMU. If fines (at least partly) benefit the Principal, his stage three payoff will then be 
decreasing in the Agent's convergence". In a literal reading the stability pact would 
then act as an insurance mechanism for the Principal, who is still interested in 
convergence but in its absence could now be partially compensated through the fines 
collected. In the contracts considered below, while S is a function of convergence 
effort according to the stability stability pact, the probability of EMU entry p  is not. 
This captures a situation close to the 1999 EMU deadline, where altering the 
Maastricht criteria no longer exerts incentive effects, and p  simply denotes how 
leniently the criteria will be applied ex post.
The introduction of the stability pact, in any of the three ways mentioned, opens 
the up the possibility for a trade-off, i.e. a relaxation of the entry conditions in return. 
Such a deal could make everybody better off, as the contracts lh  and 2b (below) 
allow EMU entry for sure (p= 1) and require less convergence from the Agent.
"  Of course, there are also good reasons why the Principal should have a positive payoff from 




























































































However, as argued in Winkler (1995), a lax application of the criteria and a large 
initial EMU will encounter less favourable starting conditions and a lower reputation. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the Waigel penalties is untested and in the case 
deterrence fails, the actual imposition of the fines will aggravate a fiscal crisis rather 
than alleviate it. For these reasons the stability pact is at most a partial substitute for 
the convergence criteria.
2a) Contract {S(E)=msE}
If the (rival) net benefits from EMU are a linear function of convergence effort, the 
Principal can choose the marginal effort incentive ms in order to maximize (18) 
subject to the Agent's first order condition, yielding:
Max V(P)  = p(TP -  ms E)  + w£
ms








The stringency of the stability pact m, e.g. the degree of automaticity of sanctions, 
is increasing in cn and decreasing in the probability of EMU happening. The optimal 
effort is the same as in case lb), when the Principal was able to set the entry 
probability to one. Here we have the mirror image of this situation. Note that the 
benefits from EMU may turn negative for the Principal but will be compensated by 
the gains from convergence.
2b) Contract {S(E)=msE, p)
If the Principal can choose both ms and p, we can assume that he picks p= 1 and 
then ms such as to induce optimal effort. This is true because both parameters are 
perfect substitutes in the Agent's first order condition, whereas not maximizing p 
would always carry an extra cost to the Principal in terms of his net (nonrival) 
benefits foregone
Max V(P)  = p(TP - m s E) + wE s.t. E * ( A )  = ~ ^ -  and p = 1 (20)




Note that the effort induced here is the same as in the previous problem, but now 
EMU will happen for sure. Renegotiation over both parameters can be beneficial: the 
Maastricht criteria will no longer be an obstacle to entry, in their place the stability 




























































































Here the Principal can only choose p, whereas the incentive mechanism (i.e. ms) is 
already in place and predetermined. Again, this might reflect a post-treaty setting, 
where the features of EMU are already in place but perhaps the probability of EMU 
coming about can be influenced by the Principal, either by committing to a stricter or 
laxer interpretation of the criteria or by varying his policy, eg. monetary policy 
stance, if that influences entry probabilities.
2c) Contract { /;}
Max V(P) = p(TP - m sE)  + tüE s.t. £ * ( A ) = ^
p P
1f RTP w
, + — , E* = -
f nr  ̂/ p Q)—— + —
2 U"U) ms J 2 ms P )





If the only instrument in the Principal's hands is a unilateral definition of the entry 
conditions he will impose an optimal effort that is greater than in the previous cases. 
The optimal probability is set to balance the losses that the incentive scheme imposes 
on the Principal in EMU and his benefits from convergence.
The Optimal Linear Contract
The above contracts, for the various specific contract forms that we imposed, in 
general do not yield the efficient cooperative effort, which calls for £=co/p. This is 
due to the contract restrictions, in particular to the absence of side-payments and the 
impossibility of separating the efficiency of EMU from the efficiency of 
convergence. It is therefore useful to confront our results with the optimal linear 
contract that would induce efficient convergence.
With a linear incentive scheme S(E)=mE+t; the Principal can pick m in order to 
provide the efficient intensity of incentives, and he can adjust the constant term t 
such as to keep the Agent to his participation constraint and appropriate all surplus 
for himself. This separation of efficiency and distributional issues was not possible in 
the formulations we looked at so far. Providing incentives was always costly to the 
Principal (since the utility transfer could not be fully recouped) and this, in general, 
led him to contract for suboptimal convergence. Recall that, as in the standard 
Principal-Agent framework, we assume that effort is not observed or contractable 





























































































Optimal Linear Contract {S(E)=mE+t}
The Principal chooses the contract parameters to maximize (24) subject to the 
Agent's first order condition derived in (25) and keeping the Agent to his 
Participation constraint (26):
Max V (P) = <j)E -  mE -  t
m,t
Max U(A)  = mE + t - - E 2 
e 2









We can substitute the Agent's first order condition into the Principal's objective 
function and also into the Agent's participation constraint, and assuming that it binds, 
solve for t in terms of m. This means that via the constant term t the Principal can 
fully recoup his losses from providing incentives. He therefore can set the intensity of 
incentives optimally in equation 27.
.2
5* = - — ,
2P
E* =0) (27)
This, of course, reproduces the standard result that with risk neutrality the Agent 
should be given full incentives, i.e. made the residual claimant of the fruits of his 
effort. The Principal is compensated by a lump-sum transfer. This is equivalent to a 
transfer of ownership regarding the benefits of convergence. With the optimal 
contract the Principal's concern over convergence is fully internalized by the Agent, 
whereas the Principal will now be indifferent with repect to convergence effort.
In the context of EMU we would argue that such a complete internalization of the 
convergence externality is not easily conceivable. In particular Germany's concern 
over convergence will not be completely neutralized by the convergence criteria, 
even though it provides some "insurance”. If EMU per se is costly, the conditional 
Maastricht incentive contract reduces Germany's concern about convergence and in 
the limit her expected utility could be the same, independent of convergence, as in 
the optimal contract: if partner countries converge, this raises the probability of 
having to sacrifice the Bundesbank sooner rather than later (or have its influence 
diluted by a larger number of countries), but the convergence may make it worth it; if 
countries don't converge, there are fewer benefits but also smaller expected losses 
from EMU. In the case of the stability pact the fines provide the Principal with partial 




























































































In terms of our model Maastricht can be seen as an efficient treaty if it organized 
"the sale of the Bundesbank" in terms of three component transactions: the 
(conditional) transfer of sovereignty from the Principal to the Agent (S) in return for 
the complete internalization of convergence incentives by the Agent (P(E) or and 
S(E)) and a sidepayment (t) that compensates the Principal for providing incentives. 
The model shows that in order to provide efficient incentives the Principal must be 
compensated, where the size of the side payment could depend on the bargaining 
strength. Applying the model to the time when the treaty was prepared and 
concluded such a sidepayment could have come in terms of concessions to Germany 
on political union or German unification, to give two popular examples. The various 
more restrictive contract forms in equations 10-23 above represent Maastricht treaty 
options in the absence of sidepayments or they describe post-treaty incentives, where 
only a subset of parameters can be adjusted by the Principal.
4. Conclusion
The paper has tried to examine various incentive effects of the Maastricht treaty, 
the convergence criteria in particular as well as a the "stability pact". There are 
several obvious omissions in the analysis (as well as the Maastricht treaty itself). 
First, we only consider a single Agent and, in general, an optimal contract should be 
tailored to individual countries. The convergence criteria, however, apply 
indiscriminately to all applicant countries. Second, with several Agents their 
behaviour interacts and co-ordination problems can arise. Third, the treaty is not a 
complete contract, in particular it is not fully state-contingent. This can be an 
important drawback in the presence of shocks. Fourth, the criteria and the treaty 
provisions in general may lack credibility, in particular ex ante and ex post incentives 
can vary. Fifth, with treaty commitment being imperfect, Maastricht represents an 
ongoing strategic game even after the conclusion of the treaty.
Some of these issues are addressed in companion papers (Winkler 19%b,c,), but 
as for the present paper, the goal was first to highlight the incentive effects of the 
treaty provisions in place, and second to argue that these provisions were put there 
for some reason. The Maastricht criteria are an attempt to induce countries to 
undertake costly convergence effort prior to entry. On paper and as a first 
approximation they represent a very simple threshold contract to select countries for 
EMU as modelled in section two. With uncertainty, the probabability of entry will 
depend on convergence and will thereby provide incentives. In section three it was 
shown how for simple linear contracts a greater likelihood of EMU and a lower 
convergence level can be achieved if the Maastricht criteria are reconsidered together 
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The second order condition for a maximum is:
To examine the effects on p* it is convenient to use the fact that p  rises if and only 
if r|) decreases (from equation 3). Rewriting the first order condition (4) in terms of ip 
and using xp=M-aE we obtain:
See Appendix B for a picture in the case of the normal distribution.
Proof of Proposition 1
Differentiate the first order condition in equation 4 and the corresponding 
probability in equation 3 (using the reformulation above) with respect to the 
parameter of interest. Assume all parameters strictly positive, f[\p) strictly positive 
over the relevant range and effort E, and therefore nonnegative. Using the
second order condition for a maximum we obtain:
dE * 
dT
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□
Proof o f Proposition 2
Recall that under certainty the critical value for T, that makes a country indifferent 
between complying with the criteria to qualify for EMU and staying out, is given by





























































































From equation 6 under certainty optimal effort is zero for T<T, whereas with 
uncertainty (for any continuous distribution function with infinite range) effort is 
always strictly positive. For T>T, again comparing the two first order conditions (4) 
and (6), we get:
/ M a r . M ^  T> £M_
P a ct2/(H>)’
which rewritten in terms of T yields the condition in (7). In terms of the picture in 
Appendix B the straight line must cut the y-axis below /(0), i.e.
f ( 0 ) > k M  with k = -~i? ■ , 
e r r
as a necessary condition for greater effort under uncertainty when the distribution 
is unimodal and centered on zero. For sufficiency we must assure a global maximum 
for x(t*<0, i.e. kM small enough.
For T=T a country would never choose higher effort because uncertainty reduces 
the expected payoff. Since by definition, under certainty it had been just indifferent, 
therefore a lower effort level will be chosen. In fact the country would prefer no 
effort to the certainty effort. □
Proof of Proposition 3




J / ( 0 ) d e - - / ( V) ^ - - / [ M - a £ + T ( l - p ) ] - ( - a  + x d̂P
dp dp . . .  . . .  dp a /(lp )
dE dE dE 1 — x/ (xp)
and, differentiating the first-order condition (9), 
recalling!)) a M -  aE + x(l -  p),  with for brevity
□
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APPENDIX B
The Example of the Normal Distribution
With the first order condition in equation 4 expressed in terms of ip we can write
/ ( V ) - pMa a  T :g(rp) whereas
P,  denotes the (negative) slope 
a  2T
We can illustrate the solution graphically in the case of the normal distribution, i.e. 
with
o
, with w = M -  aE and k =
a  2T

































































































Existence of an interior solution is assured if the straight line cuts the distribution 
function from below at least once. This will be the case as long as is continuous 
and positive over the relevant range. Then a corner solution with zero effort (i.e. tp 
=M) can be ruled out since U'(M)>0, i.e./(xp)>0.
However, there may be more than one local maximum. In the case of the normal 
distribution there could be one or two, as in the picture above. Then the high effort 
maximum (low t(j)will be the global optimum as long as area A exceeds area B as in 
the picture. For small enough M and small enough k there will be a unique high effort 
maximum. For large enough M and k there will be a unique low effort solution 
(Utility is strictly decreasing in M  and k).
A sufficient condition for a unique maximum is satisfied if the slope of the straight 
line is steeper than that of the normal distribution at the point of inflection of the 
normal distribution (i.e. at a). Otherwise M  must be small enough to always keep the 
straight line below the distribution function, i.e.:
The effect of uncertainty on effort
The effect on optimal effort of increasing the standard deviation of the normal 
distribution (mean preserving spread) is given by:
which always holds from the second order condition for a maximum.
Therefore, optimal effort rises in response to an increase in uncertainty for 
tp2 > o 2, i.e. along the tails. This, because in this region greater uncertainty raises 
the marginal benefit (probability of success) for given effort.
M -\\> < f ( y ) ^ -  if / ' ( o )< — \ -  
p a  T
hE * 
ho
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